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Synthesis of Surveillance Strategies via Belief Abstraction
Suda Bharadwaj1 and Rayna Dimitrova2 and Ufuk Topcu1
Abstract—We provide a novel framework for the synthesis
of a controller for a robot with a surveillance objective, that is,
the robot is required to maintain knowledge of the location of a
moving, possibly adversarial target. We formulate this problem
as a one-sided partial-information game in which the winning
condition for the agent is specified as a temporal logic formula.
The specification formalizes the surveillance requirement
given by the user by quantifying and reasoning over the
agent’s beliefs about a target’s location. We also incorporate
additional non-surveillance tasks. In order to synthesize a
surveillance strategy that meets the specification, we transform
the partial-information game into a perfect-information one,
using abstraction to mitigate the exponential blow-up typically
incurred by such transformations. This transformation enables
the use of off-the-shelf tools for reactive synthesis. We evaluate
the proposed method on two case-studies, demonstrating its
applicability to diverse surveillance requirements.
I. INTRODUCTION
Performing surveillance, that is, tracking the location of
a target, has many applications. If the target is adversarial,
these applications include patrolling and defense, especially
in combination with other objectives, such as providing
certain services or accomplishing a mission. Techniques for
tracking non-adversarial but unpredictable targets have been
proposed in settings like surgery to control cameras to keep a
patient’s organs under observation despite unpredictable mo-
tion of occluding obstacles [1]. Mobile robots in airports have
also been proposed to carry luggage for passengers, requiring
the robots to follow the human despite unpredictable motion
and possibly sporadically losing sight of the target [2].
When dealing with a possibly adversarial target, a strategy
for the surveying agent for achieving its objective can be seen
as a strategy in a two-player game between the agent and
the target. Since the agent may not always observe, or even
know, the exact location of the target, surveillance is, by its
very nature, a partial-information problem. It is thus natural
to reduce surveillance strategy synthesis to computing a win-
ning strategy for the agent in a two-player partial-information
game. Game-based models for related problems have been
extensively studied in the literature. Notable examples in-
clude pursuit-evasion games [3], patrolling games [4], and
graph-searching games [5], where the problem is formulated
as enforcing eventual detection, which is, in its essence a
search problem – once the target is detected, the game ends.
For many applications, this formulation is too restrictive.
Often, the goal is not to detect or capture the target, but to
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maintain certain level of information about its location over
an unbounded (or infinite) time duration, or, alternatively, be
able to obtain sufficiently precise information over and over
again. In other cases, the agent has an additional objective,
such as performing certain task, which might prevent him
from capturing the target, but allow for satisfying a more
relaxed surveillance objective.
In this paper, we study the problem of synthesizing strate-
gies for enforcing temporal surveillance objectives, such as
the requirement to never let the agent’s uncertainty about
the target’s location exceed a given threshold, or recapturing
the target every time it escapes. To this end, we consider
surveillance objectives specified in linear temporal logic
(LTL), equipped with basic surveillance predicates. This for-
mulation also allows for a seamless combination with other
task specifications. Our computational model is that of a two-
player game played on a finite graph, whose nodes represent
the possible locations of the agent and the target, and whose
edges model the possible (deterministic) moves between
locations. The agent plays the game with partial information,
as it can only observe the target when it is in its area of sight.
The target, on the other hand, always has full information
about the agent’s location, even when the agent is not in
sight. In that way, we consider a model with one-sided partial
information, making the computed strategy for the agent
robust against a potentially more powerful adversary.
We formulate surveillance strategy synthesis as the prob-
lem of computing a winning strategy for the agent in a
partial-information game with a surveillance objective. There
is a rich theory on partial-information games with LTL
objectives [6], [7], and it is well known that even for
very simple objectives the synthesis problem is EXPTIME-
hard [8], [9]. Moreover, all the standard algorithmic solutions
to the problem are based on some form of belief set construc-
tion, which transforms the imperfect-information game into
a perfect-information game and of exponentially larger size,
since the new set of states is the powerset of the original
one. Thus, such approaches scale poorly in general, and are
not applicable in most practical situations.
We address this problem by using abstraction. We in-
troduce an abstract belief set construction, which underap-
proximates the information-tracking abilities of the agent
(or, alternatively, overapproximates its belief, i.e., the set
of positions it knows the target could be in). We leverage
this construction by reasoning over the agent’s belief in the
target location, and this allows us to specify surveillance
objectives in LTL over these belief states. Thus, we provide
a framework to treat surveillance synthesis as a two-player
perfect-information game with an LTL objective, which we
then solve using off-the shelf reactive synthesis tools [10].
Our construction guarantees that the abstraction is sound, that
is, if a surveillance strategy is found in the abstract game, it
corresponds to a surveillance strategy for the original game.
If such a strategy is not found because the abstraction is
too coarse, then techniques such as counterexample guided
abstraction refinement (CEGAR) [11] can be used to au-
tomatically refine the abstraction. CEGAR has successfully
demonstrated its potential in formal verification and reactive
synthesis. CEGAR can be applied in our framework to
automatically refine abstract belief states based on counterex-
amples of the agent being unable to satisfy its surveillance
specification. For the full details of the CEGAR procedure
we refer the reader to [12], where we describe the automated
refinement of belief abstractions.
Contributions. Our contributions are as follows:
(1) We propose a formalization of surveillance objectives as
temporal logic specifications, and frame surveillance strat-
egy synthesis as a reactive synthesis problem in a partial-
information two player game.
(2) We develop an abstraction method that soundly approx-
imates surveillance strategy synthesis, thus mitigating the
state space explosion enabling the application of efficient
techniques for reactive synthesis.
(3) We demonstrate the use of our framework in practice by
evaluating our approach on different surveillance objectives
(e.g, safety, and liveness) combined with task specifications,
and discuss the qualitatively different behaviour of the syn-
thesized strategies for the different kinds of specifications.
Related work. While closely related to the surveillance
problem we consider, pursuit-evasion games with partial
information [3], [13], [14] formulate the problem as eventual
detection, and do not consider combinations with other
mission specifications. Other work, such as [15] and [16],
additionally incorporates map building during pursuit in an
unknown environment, but again solely for target detection.
Synthesis from LTL specifications [17], especially from
formulae in the efficient GR(1) fragment [18], has been
extensively used in robotic planning (e.g. [19], [20]), but
surveillance-type objectives, such as the ones we study here,
have not been considered so far. Epistemic logic specifica-
tions [21] can refer to the knowledge of the agent about
the truth-value of logical formulas, but, contrary to our
surveillance specifications, are not capable of expressing
requirements on the size of the agent’s uncertainty.
CEGAR has been developed for verification [11], and later
for control [22], of LTL specifications. It has also been
extended to infinite-state partial-information games [23],
and used for sensor design [24], both in the context of
safety specifications. In addition to being focused on safety
objectives, the refinement method in [23] is designed to
provide the agent with just enough information to achieve
safety, and is thus not applicable to surveillance properties
whose satisfaction depends on the size of the belief sets.
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(a) Surveillance arena
vis(4, 18) = false, vis(4, 17) = false,
vis(4, 19) = true, vis(4, 23) = false
(4, 18)
(3, 23) (9, 17)(3, 19)(3, 17) (9, 19) (9, 23)
(b) Transitions from the initial state
Fig. 1: A simple surveillance game on a grid arena. Obstacles
are shown in red, the agent (at location 4) and the target (at
location 18) are coloured in blue and orange respectively.
II. GAMES WITH SURVEILLANCE OBJECTIVES
We begin by defining a formal model for describing
surveillance strategy synthesis problems, in the form of a
two-player game between an agent and a target, in which the
agent has only partial information about the target’s location.
A. Surveillance Game Structures
We define a surveillance game structure to be a tuple G =
(S, sinit, T, vis), with the following components:
• S = La × Lt is the set of states, with La the set of
locations of the agent, and Lt the locations of the target;
• sinit = (linita , l
init
t ) is the initial state;
• T ⊆ S × S is the transition relation describing the
possible moves of the agent and the target; and
• vis : S → B is a function that maps a state (la, lt) to
true iff position lt is in the area of sight of la.
The transition relation T encodes the one-step move of
both the target and the agent, where the target moves first
and the agent moves second. For a state (la, lt) we define
succt(la, lt) as the set of successor locations of the target:
succt(la, lt) = {l
′
t ∈ Lt | ∃l
′
a. ((la, lt), (l
′
a, l
′
t)) ∈ T}.
We extend succt to sets of locations of the target by
stipulating that the set succt(la, L) consists of all possible
successor locations of the target for states in {la} × L.
Formally, let succt(la, L) =
⋃
lt∈L
succt(la, lt).
For a state (la, lt) and a successor location of the target l
′
t,
we denote with succa(la, lt, l
′
t) the set of successor locations
of the agent, given that the target moves to l′t:
succa(la, lt, l
′
t) = {l
′
a ∈ La | ((la, lt), (l
′
a, l
′
t)) ∈ T}.
We assume that, for every s ∈ S, there exists s′ ∈ S such
that (s, s′) ∈ T , that is, from every state there is at least
one move possible (this might be staying in the same state).
We also assume that when the target moves to an invisible
location, its position does not influence the possible one-step
moves of the agent. Formally, we require that if vis(la, l
′
t) =
vis(la, l̂
′
t) = false , then succa(la, lt, l
′
t) = succa(la, l̂t, l̂
′
t)
for all target locations lt, l
′
t, l̂t, l̂
′
t ∈ Lt. This assumption is
natural in the setting when the agent can move in one step
only to locations that are in its sight.
Example 1: Figure 1 shows an example of a surveillance
game on a grid. The sets of possible locations La and Lt for
the agent and the target consist of the squares of the grid. The
transition relation T encodes the possible one-step moves of
both the agent and the target on the grid, and incorporates
(4, {18})
(3, {17, 23}) (9, {19})(3, {19}) (9, {17, 23})
Fig. 2: Transitions from the initial state in the belief-set game
from Example 2 where vis(4, 17) = vis(4, 23) = false .
all desired constraints. For example, moving to an occupied
location, or an obstacle, is not allowed. Figure 1b shows the
possible transitions from the initial state (4, 18).
The function vis encodes straight-line visibility: a location
lt is visible from a location la if there is no obstacle on
the straight line between them. Initially the target is not
in the area of sight of the agent, but the agent knows the
initial position of the target. However, once the target moves
to one of the locations reachable in one step, in this case,
locations {17, 19, 23}, this might no longer be the case. More
precisely, if the target moves to location 19, then the agent
observes its location, but if it moves to one of the others,
then the agent no longer knows its exact location. 
B. Belief-Set Game Structures
In surveillance strategy synthesis we need to state prop-
erties of, and reason about, the information which the agent
has, i.e. its belief about the location of the target. To this end,
we can employ a powerset construction which is commonly
used to transform a partial-information game into a perfect-
information one, by explicitly tracking the knowledge one
player has as a set of possible states of the other player.
Given a set B, we denote with P(B) = {B′ | B′ ⊆ B}
the powerset (set of all subsets) of B.
For a surveillance game structure G = (S, sinit, T, vis) we
define the corresponding belief-set game structure Gbelief =
(Sbelief , s
init
belief
, Tbelief) with the following components:
• Sbelief = La×P(Lt) is the set of states, with La the set
of locations of the agent, and P(Lt) the set of belief sets
describing information about the location of the target;
• sinit
belief
= (linita , {l
init
t }) is the initial state;
• Tbelief ⊆ Sbelief × Sbelief is the transition relation where
((la, Bt), (l
′
a, B
′
t)) ∈ Tbelief iff l
′
a ∈ succa(la, lt, l
′
t) for
some lt ∈ Bt and l
′
t ∈ B
′
t and one of these holds:
(1) B′t = {l
′
t}, l
′
t ∈ succt(la, Bt), vis(la, l
′
t) = true;
(2) B′t = {l
′
t ∈ succt(la, Bt) | vis(la, l
′
t) = false}.
Condition (1) captures the successor locations of the target
that can be observed from the agent’s current position la.
Condition (2) corresponds to the belief set consisting of all
possible successor locations of the target not visible from la.
Example 2: Consider the surveillance game structure
from Example 1. The initial belief set is {18}, consisting of
the target’s initial position. After the first move of the target,
there are two possible belief sets: the set {19} resulting from
the move to a location in the area of sight of the agent, and
{17, 23} consisting of the two invisible locations reachable
in one step from location 18. Figure 2 shows the successor
states of the initial state (4, {18}) in Gbelief . 
Based on Tbelief , we can define the functions succt :
Sbelief → P(P(Lt)) and succa : Sbelief × P(Lt) → P(La)
similarly to the corresponding functions defined for G.
A run in Gbelief is an infinite sequence s0, s1, . . . of states
in Sbelief , where s0 = s
init
belief
, (si, si+1) ∈ Tbelief for all i.
A strategy for the target in Gbelief is a function ft :
S+
belief
→ P(Lt) such that ft(pi · s) = Bt implies Bt ∈
succt(s) for every pi ∈ S
∗
belief
and s ∈ Sbelief . That is, a
strategy for the target suggests a move resulting in some
belief set reachable from some location in the current belief.
A strategy for the agent in Gbelief is a function fa : S
+
belief
×
P(Lt) → Sbelief such that fa(pi · s,Bt) = (l
′
a, B
′
t) implies
B′t = Bt and l
′
a ∈ succa(s,Bt) for every pi ∈ S
∗
belief
, s ∈
Sbelief and Bt ∈ P(Lt). Intuitively, a strategy for the agent
suggests a move based on the observed history of the play
and the current belief about the target’s position.
The outcome of given strategies fa and ft for the agent
and the target in Gbelief , denoted outcome(Gbelief , fa, ft), is
a run s0, s1, . . . of Gbelief such that for every i ≥ 0, we have
si+1 = fa(s0, . . . , si, B
i
t), where B
i
t = ft(s0, . . . , si).
C. Temporal Surveillance Objectives
Since the states of a belief-set game structure track the
information that the agent has, we can state and interpret
surveillance objectives over its runs. We now formally define
the surveillance properties in which we are interested.
We consider a set of surveillance predicates SP = {pk |
k ∈ N>0}, where for k ∈ N>0 we say that a state (la, Bt) in
the belief game structure satisfies pk (denoted (la, Bt) |= pk)
iff |{lt ∈ Bt | vis(la, lt) = false}| ≤ k. Intuitively, pk is
satisfied by the states in the belief game structure where the
size of the belief set does not exceed the threshold k ∈ N>0.
We study surveillance objectives expressed by formulas of
linear temporal logic (LTL) over surveillance predicates. The
LTL surveillance formulas are generated by the grammar
ϕ := p | true | false | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ | ϕU ϕ | ϕRϕ,
where p ∈ SP is a surveillance predicate, is the next
operator, U is the until operator, and R is the release
operator. We also define the derived operators finally: ϕ =
true U ϕ and globally: ϕ = falseRϕ.
LTL formulas are interpreted over (infinite) runs. If a run
ρ satisfies an LTL formula ϕ, we write ρ |= ϕ. The formal
definition of LTL semantics can be found in [25]. Here we
informally explain the meaning of the formulas we use.
Of special interest will be surveillance formulas of the
form pk, termed safety surveillance objective, and pk,
called liveness surveillance objective. Intuitively, the safety
surveillance formula pk is satisfied if at each point in time
the size of the belief set does not exceed k. The liveness
surveillance objective pk, on the other hand, requires
that infinitely often this size is below or equal to k.
Example 3: We can specify that the agent is required to
always know with certainty the location of the target as p1.
A more relaxed requirement is that the agent’s uncertainty
never grows above 5 locations, and it infinitely often reduces
this uncertainty to at most 2 locations: p5 ∧ p2. 
D. Incorporating Task Specifications
We can integrate LTL objectives not related to surveil-
lance, i.e., task specifications, by considering, in addition to
SP , a set AP of atomic predicates interpreted over states of
G. In order to define the semantics of p ∈ AP over states
of Gbelief , we restrict ourselves to predicates observable by
the agent. Formally, we require that for p ∈ AP , and states
(la, l
′
t) and (la, l
′′
t ) with vis(la, l
′
t) = vis(la, l
′′
t ) = false it
holds that (la, l
′
t) |= p iff (la, l
′′
t ) |= p. One class of such
predicates are those that depend only on the agent’s position.
Example 4: Suppose that at goal is a predicate true ex-
actly when the agent is at some designated goal location. We
can then state that the agent visits the goal infinitely often
while always maintaining belief uncertainty of at most 10
locations using the LTL formula at goal ∧ p10. 
E. Surveillance Synthesis Problem
A surveillance game is a pair (G,ϕ), where G is a
surveillance game structure and ϕ is a surveillance objective.
A winning strategy for the agent for (G,ϕ) is a strategy fa
for the agent in the corresponding belief-set game structure
Gbelief such that for every strategy ft for the target in Gbelief
it holds that outcome(Gbelief , fa, ft) |= ϕ. Analogously, a
winning strategy for the target for (G,ϕ) is a strategy ft
such that, for every strategy fa for the agent in Gbelief , it
holds that outcome(Gbelief , fa, ft) 6|= ϕ.
Surveillance synthesis problem: Given a surveillance
game (G,ϕ), compute a winning strategy for the agent for
(G,ϕ), or determine that such a strategy does not exist.
It is well-known that two-player perfect-information
games with LTL objectives over finite-state game structures
are determined, that is exactly one of the players has a
winning strategy [26]. This means that the agent does not
have a winning strategy for a given surveillance game, if and
only if the target has a winning strategy for this game. We
refer to winning strategies of the target as counterexamples.
III. BELIEF SET ABSTRACTION
We used the belief-set game structure in order to state the
surveillance objective of the agent. While in principle it is
possible to solve the surveillance strategy synthesis problem
on this game, it is in most cases computationally infeasible,
since the size of this game is exponential in the size of
the original game. To circumvent such a construction when
possible, we propose an abstraction-based method, that given
a surveillance game structure and a partition of the set of the
target’s locations, yields an approximation that is sound with
respect to surveillance objectives for the agent.
An abstraction partition is a family Q = {Qi}
n
i=1 of
subsets of Lt, Qi ⊆ Lt such that the following hold:
•
⋃n
i=1Qi = Lt and Qi ∩Qj = ∅ for all i 6= j.
• For each p ∈ AP , Q ∈ Q and la ∈ La, it holds that
(la, l
′
t) |= p iff (la, l
′′
t ) |= p for every l
′
t, l
′′
t ∈ Q.
Intuitively, these conditions mean that Q partitions the set of
locations of the target, and the concrete locations in each of
the sets in Q agree on the value of the propositions in AP .
(4, 18)
(3, 19) (9, {Q4, Q5})(3, {Q4, Q5}) (9, 19)
Fig. 3: Transitions from the initial state in the abstract game
from Example 5 where αQ(17) = Q4 and αQ(23) = Q5.
For Q = {Qi}
n
i=1, we define a function αQ : Lt → Q
by αQ(lt) = Q for the unique Q ∈ Q with lt ∈ Q. We
denote also with αQ : P(Lt) → P(Q) the abstraction
function defined by αQ(L) = {αQ(l) | l ∈ L}. We define
a concretization function γ : P(Q) ∪ Lt → P(Lt) such that
γ(lt) = {lt} for lt ∈ Lt, and γ(A) =
⋃
Q∈AQ if A ∈ P(Q).
Intuitively, the abstraction of a set L of locations of the
target is a set of elements of Q that cover L, and each of
them has non-empty intersection with L. The concretization
of a set of elements of Q is the set of locations of the
target formed by the union of these sets. Thus, we have
γ(αQ(L)) ⊇ L, which means that the belief of the agent
is overapproximated by the abstraction as desired.
Given a surveillance game structure G = (S, sinit, T, vis)
and an abstraction partition Q = {Qi}
n
i=1 of the set Lt, we
define the abstraction of G w.r.t. Q to be the game structure
Gabstract = αQ(G) = (Sabstract, s
init
abstract
, Tabstract), where
• Sabstract = (La×P(Q))∪(La×Lt) is the set of abstract
states, consisting of states approximating the belief sets
in the game structure Gbelief , as well as the states S;
• sinit
abstract
= (linita , l
init
t ) is the initial abstract state;
• Tabstract ⊆ Sabstract × Sabstract is the transition relation
such that ((la, At), (l
′
a, A
′
t)) ∈ Tabstract if and only if
one of the following two conditions is satisfied:
(1) A′t = l
′
t, l
′
t ∈ succt(γ(At)) and vis(la, l
′
t) = true ,
and l′a ∈ succa(la, lt, l
′
t) for some lt ∈ γ(At).
(2) A′t = αQ({l
′
t ∈ succt(γ(At))|vis(la, l
′
t) = false}),
and l′a ∈ succa(la, lt, l
′
t) for some lt ∈ γ(At) and
some l′t ∈ succt(γ(At)) with vis(la, l
′
t) = false .
As for the belief-set game structure, the first condition
captures the successor locations of the target, which can be
observed from the agent’s current location la. Condition (2)
corresponds to the abstract belief set whose concretization
consists of all possible successors of all positions in γ(At),
which are not visible from la. Since the belief abstraction
overapproximates the agent’s belief, that is, γ(αQ(B)) ⊇ B,
the next-state abstract belief γ(A′t) may include positions in
Lt that are not successors of positions in γ(At).
Example 5: Consider again the surveillance game from
Example 1, and the abstraction partition Q = {Q1, . . . , Q5},
where the set Qi corresponds to the i-th row of the grid.
For location 17 of the target we have αQ(17) = Q4,
and for 23 we have αQ(23) = Q5. Thus, the belief set
B = {17, 23} is covered by the abstract belief set αQ(B) =
{Q4, Q5}. Figure 3 shows the successors of the initial
state (4, 18) of the abstract belief-set game structure. The
concretization of the abstract belief set {Q4, Q5} is the set
{15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24} of target locations. 
An abstract state (la, At) satisfies a surveillance predicate
pk, denoted (la, At) |= pk, iff |{lt ∈ γ(At) | vis(la, lt) =
false}| ≤ k. Simply, the number of states in the concretized
belief set has to be less than or equal to k. Similarly, for
a predicate p ∈ AP , we define (la, At) |= p iff for every
lt ∈ γ(At) it holds that (la, lt) |= p. With these definitions,
we can interpret surveillance objectives over runs of Gabstract.
Strategies (and winning strategies) for the agent and the
target in an abstract belief-set game (αQ(G), ϕ) are defined
analogously to strategies (and winning strategies) in Gbelief .
In the construction of the abstract game structure, we
overapproximate the belief-set of the agent at each step.
Since we consider surveillance predicates that impose upper
bounds on the size of the belief, such an abstraction gives
more power to the target (and dually less power to the agent).
This construction guarantees, as stated in Theorem 1, that the
abstraction is sound, meaning that an abstract strategy for the
agent that achieves a surveillance objective corresponds to a
winning strategy in the concrete game. Soundness follows
from the fact that the abstract belief game simulates the
concrete one. The following theorem formally states the
soundness property of the abstraction.
Theorem 1: Let G be a surveillance game structure, Q =
{Qi}
n
i=1 be an abstraction partition, and Gabstract = αQ(G).
For every surveillance objective ϕ, if there exists a win-
ning strategy for the agent in the abstract belief-set game
(αQ(G), ϕ), then there exists a winning strategy for the agent
in the concrete surveillance game (G,ϕ).
IV. ABSTRACTION PRECISION
The ideal choice of an abstraction partition is the one
that balances precision and computational burden. More
precisely, the abstraction should be precise enough for the
agent to satisfy its surveillance objective. On the other
hand, an abstraction that is too precise, often results in an
intractably large state space of the resulting game. Thus, a
good abstraction is one that gives the right level of precision
where it is needed, and is coarse (that is, generates fewer
abstract belief states) where precision is not needed. Thus,
choosing a good abstraction partition is often specific to
the game environment and the surveillance specification. In
section V, we present examples with user specified partitions
resulting in feasible abstract games.
In the previous section, we discussed that a winning
strategy for the agent in the abstract belief game corresponds
to a strategy for the agent in the concrete belief game.
This, fact does not hold in general for the abstract winning
strategies of the target. We refer to the abstract winning
strategies for the target as abstract counterexamples.
Given an abstract counterexample, there are two possi-
bilities: it can either be a counterexample in the concrete
belief game, meaning that the agent cannot satisfy the
surveillance objective, or it may exist due to the coarseness
of the abstraction partition. We now discuss in more detail
counterexamples in safety and liveness surveillance games.
The latter generalizes also to general surveillance objectives.
(4, 18)
(3, {Q4, Q5})(9, {Q4, Q5})
(a) Abstract counterexample tree
(4, 18)
(3, {17, 23}) (9, {17, 23})
(b) Concrete counterexample tree
Fig. 4: Abstract and corresponding concrete counterexample
trees for the surveillance game in Example 6.
A. Counterexamples for Safety Surveillance Properties
A winning strategy for the target in a game with safety
surveillance objective can be represented as a tree. An
abstract counterexample tree Cabstract for (Gabstract, pk) is
a finite tree, whose nodes are labelled with states in Sabstract
such that the following conditions are satisfied:
• The root node is labelled with the initial state sinit
abstract
.
• A node is labelled with an abstract state which violates
pk (that is, sabstract where sabstract 6|= pk) iff it is a leaf.
• The tree branches according to all possible transition
choices of the agent. Formally, if an internal node v is
labelled with (la, At), then there is unique A
′
t such that:
(1) ((la, At), (l
′
a, A
′
t)) ∈ Tabstract for some l
′
a ∈ La, and
(2) for every l′a ∈ La such that ((la, At), (l
′
a, A
′
t)) ∈
Tabstract, there is a child v
′ of v labelled with (l′a, A
′
t).
A concrete counterexample tree Cbelief for (Gbelief , pk)
is a finite tree defined analogously to an abstract counterex-
ample tree with nodes labelled with states in Sbelief .
Due to the overapproximation of the belief sets, not
every counterexample in the abstract game corresponds to
a winning strategy for the target in the original game.
An abstract counterexample Cabstract in (Gabstract, pk) is
concretizable if there exists a concrete counterexample tree
Cbelief in (Gbelief , pk), that differs from Cabstract only in the
node labels, and each node labelled with (la, At) in Cabstract
has label (la, Bt) in Cbelief for which Bt ⊆ γ(At).
Example 6: Figure 4a shows an abstract counterexample
tree Cabstract for the game (αQ(G), p1), where G is the
surveillance game structure from Example 1 and Q is the
abstraction partition from Example 5. The counterexample
corresponds to the choice of the target to move to one of
the locations 17 or 23, which, for every possible move of
the agent, results in an abstract state with abstract belief
B = {Q4, Q5} violating p1. A concrete counterexample tree
Cbelief concretizing Cabstract is shown in Figure 4b. 
B. Counterexamples for Liveness Surveillance Properties
The counterexamples for general surveillance properties
are directed graphs, which may contain cycles. In particular,
for a liveness surveillance property of the form pk each
infinite path in the graph has a position such that, from this
position on, each state on the path violates pk. An abstract
counterexample graph in the game (Gabstract, pk) is
a finite graph Cabstract defined analogously to the abstract
counterexample tree. The difference is that there are no
leaves, and that for each cycle ρ = v1, v2, . . . , vn with
v1 = vn in Cabstract that is reachable from v0, every node
vi in ρ is labelled with state s
i
abstract
where si
abstract
6|= pk.
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 14
15 16 17 18 19
20 21 22 23 24
Fig. 5: Agent locations on an (infinite)
path in the abstract counterexample
graph from Example 7. In the graph,
the first node is labelled with (4, 18),
the second with (9, {Q2}), and all
other nodes with some (la, {Q1, Q2}).
Example 7: We saw in Example 6 that in the safety
surveillance game (G, p1) the agent does not have a
winning strategy. We now consider a relaxed requirement,
namely, that the uncertainty drops to at most 1 infinitely of-
ten. We consider the liveness surveillance game (G, p2).
Let Q = {Q1, Q2} be a partition such that Q1, corre-
sponds to the first two columns of the grid in Figure 1a
and the set Q2 contains the locations from the other three
columns of the grid. Figure 5 shows an infinite path (in
lasso form) in the abstract game (αQ(G), p2). The
figure depicts only the corresponding trajectory (sequence of
positions) of the agent. The initial abstract state is (4, 18),
the second node on the path is labeled with the abstract state
(9, {Q2}), and all other nodes on the path are labeled with
abstract states of the form (la, {Q1, Q2}). As each abstract
state in the cycle violates p2, the path violates p2. The
same holds for all infinite paths in the existing abstract
counterexample graph. 
A concrete counterexample graph Cbelief for the belief
game (Gbelief , pk) is defined analogously.
An abstract counterexample graph Cabstract for the game
(Gabstract, pk) is concretizable if there exists a coun-
terexample Cbelief in (Gbelief , pk), such that for each
infinite path piabstract = v
0
abstract
, v1
abstract
, . . . starting from
the initial node of Cabstract there exists an infinite path
pibelief = v
0
belief
, v1
belief
, . . . in Cbelief starting from its initial
node. Furthermore, if vi
abstract
is labelled with (la, At) in
Cabstract, then the corresponding node v
i
belief
in Cbelief is
labelled with (la, Bt) for some Bt ∈ P(Lt) for which
Bt ⊆ γ(At).
C. Counterexample-Guided Refinement
Since the game structures we consider are finite, and
counterexamples have finite representation, we can effec-
tively determine whether an abstract counterexample is con-
cretizable or not. In the first case we report the unreal-
izability of the surveillance objective. In the second case,
the counterexample can be used to determine which parts
of the abstraction need to be refined in order to eliminate
this, and possibly other, counterexamples. This analysis and
refinement procedure can be automated, and we refer the
reader to [12] for more details on the process. We remark
that even when the refinement is automated, the choice of
the initial abstraction often plays a crucial role in keeping
the size of the abstract game within feasible limits.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We report on the application of our approach for surveil-
lance synthesis in two case studies. We have implemented
the proposed method in Python, using the slugs reactive
(a) Gridworld with a user provided
abstraction partition with 7 sets,
marked by black lines.
(b) Gridworld showing visibility of the
agent. All locations shown in black are
invisible to the agent.
Fig. 6: 10x15 gridworld with a surveillance liveness specifi-
cation. The agent is blue, and the target to be surveilled is
orange. Red states are obstacles.
(a) t1 (b) t3 (c) t4
(d) t5 (e) t6 (f) t7
Fig. 7: Evolution of the agent’s belief about the target’s
location as it moves to the goal and loses sight of the target.
Grey cells represent the locations the agent believes the
target could be in. We show the belief at different timesteps
t1, . . . , t7 (note that t2 is excluded for simplicity).
synthesis tool [10]. The experiments were performed on an
Intel i5-5300U 2.30 GHz CPU with 8 GB of RAM.
A. Liveness Surveillance Specification + Task Specification
Figure 6a shows a gridworld divided into regions. The
surveillance objective requires the agent to infinitely often
know precisely the location of the target (either see it, or have
a belief consisting of one cell). Additionally, it has to perform
the task of patrolling (visiting infinitely often) the green
’goal’ cell. Formally, the specification is p1∧ goal .
The agent can move up to 3 grid cells away at each step, and
the target can move 1 cell at each step. The sensor mode,
that is, the visibility function, used here is ’line-of-sight’ with
a range of 5 cells. The agent cannot see through obstacles
(shown in red) and cannot see farther than 5 cells away.
Using the abstraction partition of size 7 shown in Figure
6a, the overall number of abstract belief states is 15× 10 +
27 = 278 states. In contrast, solving the full belief game will
have in the order of 2150 states, which is a state-space size
that state-of-the-art synthesis tools cannot handle.
Figure 7 shows how the belief of the agent (shown in
grey) can grow quickly when it cannot see the target. This
growth occurs due to the coarseness of the abstraction, which
overapproximates the target’s true position. In 7 steps, the
agent believes the target can be anywhere in the grid that
(a) t5 (b) t7 (c) t9
Fig. 8: The agent has to search for the target in order to
lower its belief below the surveillance liveness specification.
(a) t1 (b) t3 (c) t4
(d) t5 (e) t6 (f) t7
Fig. 9: Evolution of the agent’s belief about the target’s
location in a game with an abstraction partition of size 12.
is not in its vision. It has to then find the target in order to
satisfy the surveillance requirement. Figure 8 illustrates the
searching behaviour of the agent when it is trying to lower
the belief below the threshold in order to satisfy the liveness
specification. The behaviour of the agent shown here will
contrast with the behaviour under safety surveillance which
will we look at next.
In this example, an abstraction partition of size 7 was
enough to guarantee the satisfaction surveillance specifica-
tion. For the purpose of comparison, we also solve the game
with an abstraction partition of size 12 to illustrate the change
in belief growth. Figure 9 shows the belief states growing
much more slowly as the abstract belief states are smaller,
and thus they more closely approximate the true belief of the
agent.
The additional abstraction partitions result in a much larger
game as the state space grows exponentially in the size
of the abstraction partition. Table I compares the sizes of
the corresponding abstract games, and the time it takes to
synthesize a surveillance controller in each case.
Size of abstraction partition Size of abstract game Synthesis time
7 278 237s
12 4346 810s
TABLE I: Comparison of synthesis times for the two cases
A video simulation of the synthesized surveillance strategy
against a target controlled by a human can be found at
http://goo.gl/YkFuxr.
B. Safety Surveillance Specification + Task Specification
Figure 10 depicts an environment created in Gazebo where
the red blocks model buildings. The drone is given full line
Fig. 10: A Gazebo environment where the red blocks are
obstacles that the drones cannot see past. The green drone
is the agent and the orange drone is the target.
of sight vision - it can detect the target if there is no obstacle
in the way.
In this setting, we enforce the safety surveillance objective
p30 (the belief size should never exceed 30) in addition to
infinitely often reaching the green cell. The formal specifi-
cation is p30 ∧ goal . Additionally, the target itself is
trying to reach the goal cell infinitely often as well, which
is known to the agent.
We used an abstraction generated by a partition of size
6, which was sufficiently precise to compute a surveillance
strategy in 210 s. Again, note that the precise belief-set game
would have in the order of 2200 states.
We simulated the environment and the synthesized surveil-
lance strategy for the agent in Gazebo and ROS. In the
simulation, the target is being controlled by a human while
the agent responds using the synthesized surveillance strat-
egy. A video of the simulation can be found at http:
//goo.gl/LyC1gQ. This simulation shows a qualitative
difference in behaviour compared to the previous example.
There, in the case of liveness surveillance, the agent had more
leeway to completely lose the target in order to reach its goal
location, even though the requirement of reducing the size
of the belief to 1 is quite strict. Here, on the other hand, the
safety surveillance objective, even with a large threshold of
30, forces the agent to follow the target more closely, in order
to prevent its belief from getting too large. The synthesis
algorithm thus provides the ability to obtain qualitatively
different behaviour as necessary for specific applications by
combining different objectives.
C. Discussion
The difference in the behaviour in the case studies high-
lights the different use cases of the surveillance objectives.
Depending on the domain, the user can specify a combination
of safety and liveness specification to tune the behaviour
of the agent. In a critical surveillance situation (typical in
defense or security situations), the safety specification will
guarantee to the user that the belief will never grow too large.
However, in less critical situations (such as luggage carrying
robots in airports), the robot has more flexibility in allowing
the belief to grow as long as it can guarantee its reduction
in the future.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a novel approach to solving a surveil-
lance problem with information guarantees. We provided a
framework that enables the formalization of the surveillance
synthesis problem as a two-player, partial-information game.
We then presented a method to reason over the belief that
the agent has over the target’s location, which allows for
specifying and enforcing surveillance requirements. The user
can tailor the behaviour to their specific application by using
a combination of safety and liveness surveillance objectives.
The benefit of the proposed framework is that it allows us
to employ techniques successfully used in verification and
reactive synthesis to develop efficient methods for solving the
surveillance problem. There are several promising avenues of
future work using and extending this framework. Some of the
directions currently being explored are the following:
• Synthesizing distributed strategies for multi-agent
surveillance in a decentralized manner. Compositional
synthesis methods can be used to avoid the blow-up
of the state space that occurs in centralized synthesis
procedures as the number of surveillance agents grows.
• Incorporating static sensors or alarm triggers for the
mobile agent(s) to coordinate with.
• Allowing for sensor models to include uncertainty and
detection errors while still providing surveillance guar-
antees.
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